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n the language of competition economics, there are three modern 
energy markets: transport fuels, electricity, and the production of 
heat and cooling.  While there are important changes occurring in all 
three value chains—notably, the first signs of serious alternatives to 
oil in the transport markets1—the greatest turmoil is occurring in the 
energy sector.  Both competition and regulatory policy will play very 
substantial roles in determining the industry’s future structure and 
performance as it evolves in response to current challenges. 
 
∗ Dr. Peter Fox-Penner, principal and chairman emeritus of The Brattle Group, 
specializes in economic, regulatory, and strategic issues in network industries.  This 
Article is based on his comments at the American Antitrust Institute’s 2010 Annual 
Conference: Public and Private—Are the Boundaries in Transition? on June 24, 2010.  
Heidi Bishop is a policy and marketing coordinator with The Brattle Group.  The views 
expressed in this Article are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of The Brattle Group or its clients. 
1 Recent developments in biodiesel, ethanol, hydrogen, and propane fuels indicate 
growing potential to reduce oil use in transport markets.  Domestic production of biodiesel 
has increased substantially during the past decade, and advances in storage technology are 
increasing the value of hydrogen-powered vehicles.  For the most recent achievements in 
alternative and advanced fuels, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Alternative Fuels & Advanced 
Vehicles Data Center, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/fuels/biodiesel.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2010).  
Steady improvements in electric vehicle technology hold greater promise for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector.  The National Research Council projects 
a “maximum practical” fleet penetration of plug-in hybrid vehicles of thirteen percent by 
2030 with a “more probable” penetration of less than five percent by the same time.  
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, TRANSITIONS TO ALTERNATIVE 
TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES—PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES (2010).  
I
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Historically, electric market reform has been viewed through the 
lens of generation deregulation.2  Because energy production occurs 
in three vertical stages, and jurisdiction over these stages is split 
between the states and the federal government, deregulation has 
proceeded regionally in the wholesale generation markets via federal 
rules and sporadically in retail markets across the fifty states.  
Transmission and distribution continue to be comprehensively 
regulated.  This mosaic has produced a mixed record of successes and 
failures, with little or no political will to make deregulation a uniform 
national policy.3 
One could spend many days decomposing the various reasons why 
retail electric competition has not worked well, but such a backward-
looking exercise is largely of only academic value.4  In this 
postmillennial era, there are new forces at work that introduce 
changes much larger than deregulation ever wrought and that are 
much more important to national policy.  Regulators and other 
stakeholders must turn their attention to the enormous new change 
drivers and the development of appropriate forms of market 
governance to manage a very different future power industry. 
The first of the three giant drivers at work is global climate change.  
To mitigate the adverse impacts of higher greenhouse gas 
concentrations on human health, the environment, and the economy, 
the power sector will have to invest close to one trillion dollars before 
 
2 Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the 
Electrical Power Industry, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 125 (1989) 
(providing an excellent overview of electric market reform); see also CHARLES J. 
CICCHETTI & COLIN M. LONG, RESTRUCTURING ELECTRICITY MARKETS: A WORLD 
PERSPECTIVE POST CALIFORNIA AND ENRON (2003); PAUL J. JOSKOW & RICHARD 
SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY 
DEREGULATION (1983).  For a more complete listing of literature discussing studies of 
wholesale and retail competition, see PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE 
CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES, at app. C (2010) 
[hereinafter PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER]; Peter Fox-Penner, A New Book on the 
Transformation of the Energy Industry, SMART POWER, http://www.smartpowerbook.com 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (reviews, commentary, and more). 
3 For current information on electric competition, see COMPETE COALITION, 
http://www.competecoalition.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).  For a map of electricity 
restructuring by state, see U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Status of Electricity Restructuring by 
State, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring 
/restructure_elect.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
4 See PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER, supra note 2.  
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2030 to build low-carbon power sources and corresponding power 
lines to connect them.5 
These investments are driven not by the ordinary course of supply 
and demand but by an essential public imperative.  As the National 
Academy of Sciences recently observed, many of the technologies 
needed to decarbonize electricity generation are more expensive than 
traditional sources and carry much more technological and financial 
risk.6  It is not unusual for today’s power executives to describe a coal 
plant that features carbon capture and sequestration or a new nuclear 
plant as a “bet-the-company strategy”—and there are many more 
exotic new generation sources at various stages of development.7 
Because public policies, and not price signals, are driving 
electricity generation investment toward clean, innovative resources, 
it is irrational to think that a vertically deintegrated, competitive 
generation market would naturally cause this to occur—especially in 
the absence of strong carbon price signals, which are largely absent in 
the United States.  Instead, we need just the opposite: a generation 
sector that builds publicly mandated technologies with tacit or explicit 
assurances that these investments will not be undercut by competitors 
who sell cheaper, dirtier power.  Despite the increasingly important 
need for a price on carbon emissions, we think this will happen only 
with a substantial degree of intervention in the generation sector, 
especially in the form of vertical integration or contracts. 
All this suggests that there is an essential connection between the 
vertical industry structure, competition policies, and public interest 
imperatives that will dominate the generating sector’s activities. 
Evaluating industry structure and competition questions without 
considering the public policy mandates affecting the sector is 
unrealistic and unwise. 
 
5 MARC W. CHUPKA ET AL., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER INDUSTRY: THE 
INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030 (2008), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues 
/finance/Documents/Transforming_Americas_Power_Industry.pdf; see also NAT’L ACAD. 
OF SCIENCES, AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION 
(2009); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2008: SCENARIOS 
AND STRATEGIES TO 2050 (2008). 
6 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES ET AL., ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES: 
STATUS, PROSPECTS, AND IMPEDIMENTS 133-80 (2010). 
7 At the same time, it should be noted that several low-carbon power sources are more 
expensive but not usually risky, namely power from wind, solar, and natural gas.  See id.  
It is no surprise that nearly all capacity additions today are from these resources. 
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The second great transformative agent disrupting the power sector 
today is the smart grid (SG).  The SG is the application of digital 
control, sensoring, and communications technologies to the power 
grid.  These technologies will enable utilities to monitor, analyze, 
control, and repair the grid much more efficiently than ever before, all 
while enabling new business and regulatory models that will facilitate 
the transition to a low-carbon power industry.8 
Currently, many SG technologies that are not visible to consumers 
are being gradually, but steadily, deployed.  Consumers will 
experience these technologies only via benefits they will never be 
able to trace to the technologies, such as shorter periods of power 
outages or voltage fluctuations.  These “invisible” SG technologies 
will help utilities manage their systems with greater efficiency and 
reliability, much as sensors and digital diagnostic technologies are 
helping most nonutility businesses squeeze more productivity out of 
their assets. 
The real transformation brought about by the SG, however, comes 
from the more visible aspects of these technologies.  The SG will 
make customers aware of their own power use in real time, appliance 
by appliance, and allow them to program the timing of these 
appliances to use power during cheaper time periods.  They will also 
be able to generate and store their own energy, sell it back to the grid, 
and interact with the grid using vastly more sophisticated service 
arrangements than we use today. 
In basic economic terms, this means that electricity markets will 
finally have a use-specific, short-run demand curve in place of 
today’s very slow-acting, long-run demand curve.  Until now, 
consumer reaction to higher electricity prices occurred only after 
months or even years, as prices in monthly bills have gradually 
impacted power users via new investments and behavior shifts.  With 
the SG, however, hourly power prices will impact hourly power use.  
Innovative ways to price and sell power, as well as power-saving 
practices and technologies, will proliferate.9 
 
8 LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN 
INTRODUCTION, available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG 
_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf; Peter Fox-Penner, Smart Power Business Models for a 
Smarter Grid, SMART GRID NEWS.COM (June 8, 2010), http://www.smartgridnews.com 
/artman/publish/Business_Strategy/Smart-Power-Business-Models-for-a-Smarter-Grid-
2489.html. 
9 Ahmad Faruqui et al., The Power of Dynamic Pricing, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 3, Apr. 
2009, at 42, [pincite]; see also AHMAD FARUQUI & LISA WOOD, QUANTIFYING THE 
BENEFITS OF DYNAMIC PRICING IN THE MASS MARKET (2008), available at 
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The blossoming of the market for power control is likely to 
ultimately create a second wind for vertical deintegration and retail 
power deregulation.  An avalanche of firms, from tiny startups to the 
mighty Googles and IBMs of the world, want to sell energy and 
services to customers who have SG technologies, displacing 
traditional power companies at the end of the electricity supply chain.  
Structurally speaking, this occurs most logically if retail electricity 
sales are deregulated.10 
In a nutshell, what we have today is a collision between public 
mandates that promote active or tacit vertical integration alongside a 
disruptive technological change that is prompting new calls for retail 
deintegration and deregulation.  Two tremendously powerful and 
equally valid opposing forces are at work, and the electricity utility 
industry is squarely in the crosshairs. 
No one claims to know, with any certainty, how this tension will 
play out.  The most likely outcome may be a shift toward greater 
deintegration and deregulation, as this would be consistent with the 
impact of modern information technology on many vertically 
integrated industries.  However, it would be unwise to place any large 
bets on that outcome—vertical integration has proven to be quite 
resilient in the network industries, especially among power and water 
utilities, and this may well continue. 
One thing, however, is abundantly clear: our institutions of 
electricity regulation are flatly under-equipped to manage this tension 
and the industry’s overall transition.  U.S. electricity regulation was 
designed a century ago to encourage a build-out of the grid for the 
purpose of establishing scale economies and therefore low-cost 
commodity power.  Today’s regulatory environment resembles a 
patchwork quilt that veers between parochial state politics and the 
national interest, largely omitting the correct locus of planning and 
 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/electricitydistribution/Documents/quantifying_benefits_final
_append.pdf; AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., BRATTLE GROUP, THE POWER OF FIVE PERCENT: 
HOW DYNAMIC PRICING CAN SAVE $35 BILLION IN ELECTRICITY COSTS (2007), 
available at http://www.ecoalign.com/system/files/Project+Energy+Code+02+Feb2009 
+vf.pdf. 
10 L. LYNNE KIESLING, PROJECT ENERGY CODE: MARKETS, TECHNOLOGY AND 
INSTITUTIONS: INCREASING ENERGY EFFICIENCY THROUGH DECENTRALIZED 
COORDINATION (2009), available at http://www.ecoalign.com/system/files/Project 
+Energy+Code+02+Feb2009+vf.pdf; Lynne Kiesling, Dep’t of Econ. & Kellogg Sch. of 
Mgmt., Northwestern Univ., Network Economics: Electricity and Smart Grid Technology 
(May 18, 2007), available at http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/documents/conferences/2008 
.05.17-203/Kiesling.pdf. 
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governance, which is the multistate region.  Current regulatory law, 
regulator core competencies, and many embedded incentives are all 
wrong for the industry’s coming era. 
This is an argument for neither removing nor expanding regulation, 
as neither has much chance of occurring.  Rather, it is an argument for 
retooling regulation extensively, just as we are starting to do in the 
financial sector.  Like its financial cousin, electricity regulation was 
born in an era of very different technologies and policy needs.  
Electricity regulatory reform is made even more difficult by the fact 
that states have retained the majority of regulatory power over two-
thirds of the industry while the final third is government- or customer-
owned and often exempt from all state and federal policies.  In 
addition, the power grid handles the most essential of our 
infrastructure functions and, by many accounts, is highly vulnerable 
to cyber attacks and privacy concerns.11 
We cannot fault the current administration for inactivity in energy 
policy making, as a tremendous amount has been accomplished since 
President Obama took office.  Moreover, the current administration 
has an understanding of many of these issues and a desire to improve 
related policies.  However, the existing system is anchored far too 
deeply in law, culture, and business models to change without strong 
and sustained leadership. 
The future of the power industry is destined for extensive change—
there is no stopping it.  We need not wait for a crisis analogous to the 
financial crash of 2008 to force an upgrading of regulation to align 
with the imperatives of our era.  As Churchill once noted, most 
democracies can be counted on to do the right thing only after they 
have exhausted all the other options.  In this case we should be 
proactive enough to begin changing utility regulation to align with 
emerging technologies, new business structures, and the next 
century’s national and global policy imperatives now, before we are 
left without any choice but to act in haste. 
 
 
11 See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT 
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2010); SMART GRID 
SECURITY BLOG, http://smartgridsecurity.blogspot.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
